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Abstract
This study of appellate advocacy examines factors that affect judicial treatment of precedents
identified in litigant briefs. Although we find some attorney and party characteristics influence
whether a court addresses precedent cited by a party, legal resources are not as influential in
determining whether the court adopts a party’s use of a precedent. At times, ideological
congruence between the circuit panel and the litigant can increase the likelihood that the court’s
opinion will use a precedent in the same way as presented by the litigants. There is also some
support for the importance of attorney experience. Even when their clients ultimately win the
case, attorneys with no experience before the circuit are less likely to see the court use litigantcited precedents in a similar way to the party brief. Even when their clients lose, there is some
support to show that attorneys with more experience are more likely to see the court’s opinion
address the precedents the attorneys have raised positively.

This suggests that attorney

experience has some influence in shaping legal policy, regardless of whether the litigant wins or
loses.
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The Value of Precedent:
Attorney Briefs and Judicial Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
This study analyzes appellate advocates’ role in shaping judicial opinions in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals. Drawing from prior research that suggests stronger parties and expert counsel are more
likely to prevail in case outcomes before the lower federal appellate courts, we focus on judicial
decisions to use precedents raised in the appellate briefs. Our analysis draws on original data to
compare legal “inputs” by attorneys with legal “outputs” by judges. By examining precedents
used in litigant briefs and the courts’ use of or indifference to those precedents, we can further
evaluate the role of parties and their attorneys in providing pertinent information and influencing
court decisions.
First, we discuss the role that litigants and their counsel have in framing the issues on
appeal and the particular importance of appellate briefs in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Next, we
discuss how parties and judges use precedent. Building on these foundations, we then examine
variation in judicial treatment of litigant-identified precedents and test our expectations using
appellate briefs and majority opinions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
After evaluating the informational role of appellate advocacy, we assess factors that determine
litigant success in persuading courts to use precedents in a manner that is consistent with the
position adopted in the appellate brief. Then we explore the potential linkages between
winning, losing, and appellate advocacy.

ISSUE FRAMING AND ARGUMENTS IN APPELLATE BRIEFS
On appeal, attorneys have two possible mechanisms for persuading judges: written briefs and
oral arguments before the panel. However, the latter is not granted to every appeal, and even
2

when oral argument is granted, it typically builds on arguments presented in the briefs.1
Consequently, judges largely rely on attorneys’ written arguments as a basis for evaluating the
dispute before them (Michel, 1998).2 Courts themselves stress the importance of the briefs
relative to oral arguments. For example, in an instructional handbook provided to attorneys, the
Seventh Circuit emphasizes that briefs are “the first step in persuasion, as well as being by far the
more important step” and “should contain all that the judges will want to know, including
references to anything other than the briefs that may have to be consulted in the record or in the
precedents” (Practitioner’s Handbook, 2003:71-75). In this way, each party presents its own
picture of the dispute, which it attempts to shape to its best advantage, largely through the use of
influential prior cases.3
As specified by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure as well as circuit rules,
attorneys must follow a highly standardized format for the written briefs that includes detailed
instructions on the sequence with which parties must file their briefs, as well as the order of the
content within each document. These rules dictate that the appellant must be the first to file a
brief that reviews the facts of the case, identifies the central legal issues of the claim, and then
elaborates upon those issues. Typically, the respondent brief then uses the issues identified by
the appellant as a baseline and modifies or reframes them in a way favorable to the respondent’s
position. The respondent also has the ability to raise issues that are not discussed by the
appellant. Finally, the appellant may file a reply brief to counter any new arguments raised by
the respondent or to attempt to distinguish precedents used by the respondent.
The extent to which judges accept the arguments put forth by one party (rather than by
the other) can be influenced by the way in which attorneys couch the issues at stake. Attorneys
engage in this type of behavior, first, by constructing the wording of their statement of issues in
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the light most favorable to their client, and second, by selectively using favorable precedent and
legal authorities to explicate their position in the “Argument” section of the brief (Haire and
Moyer, 2008:596).
One recent study on the Supreme Court tested this linkage, using plagiarism software to
identify when language from litigant briefs was used in Supreme Court opinions. Attorney
experience, ideological compatibility, and elite cues (specifically, Washington attorneys and the
solicitor general) all increased the likelihood that a Supreme Court opinion would directly
borrow from a party’s brief (Corley, 2008). The notion that judges respond to the reputation of
the source has additional support in research on political persuasion, suggesting that the
likelihood of a cue being well received by the “listener” depends in large part on a listener’s
perceptions of the “speaker.” In order to be convincing, the speaker must build a relationship of
trust so that the listener will view the speaker as a credible source of information (Lupia, 2002).
Applied to this context, a judge’s assessment of an issue frame, including the argument and
precedents used to support that argument, may vary with his or her perceptions of those who
have presented these arguments in the appellate brief.

ARGUMENTS, REASONING, AND PRECEDENT
Counsel’s ability to persuade a panel of judges often hinges on their use of relevant legal
authorities, including precedent. The use of precedent in legal decision making reflects what is
often referred to as analogical reasoning: to resolve a given dispute, a decision maker should
look to similar disputes that have been resolved in the past, determine the rule established by the
past decisions, and apply that rule to the current circumstances. Analogical reasoning through
precedent both organizes and legitimizes legal decision making (Braman and Nelson, 2007).
4

However, not all precedents are created equal. In the context of the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
judges must contend with several sources of precedent, some of which are binding, and some of
which may be considered persuasive or advisory (Johns and Perschbacher, 2007:110-11). While
all circuits are bound by Supreme Court precedent, each circuit develops its own body of law
that is binding within that circuit but not within others.4 Aside from territorial factors and judicial
hierarchy considerations that limit the applicability of precedents, scholars have used a variety of
measures to show that the relative strength and importance of individual precedents often wax or
wane over time (Hansford and Spriggs, 2006; Biskupic and Witt, 1997; Cook, 1993). More
recently, judicial scholars have begun to examine the psychological processes that underlie legal
decision making (Braman, 2006; Furgeson, Babcock, and Shane, 2008) and, specifically, the use
of precedent. Braman and Nelson (2007) find evidence that legal decision makers vary
somewhat in their judgments about the relative similarity of two cases.
To understand how specific precedents ultimately make their way into the court’s
opinion, it is important to move beyond a focus on case outcomes and, alternatively, compare the
use and treatment of precedent from attorneys’ briefs with that in the court’s opinion. We
develop our analysis in three distinct parts, each representing a different perspective on
understanding court use of precedent identified in the litigants’ briefs. The first analysis
examines whether the court’s opinion addresses the precedent cited by the attorney in any way.
This perspective emphasizes the informational role played by litigants and their counsel,
focusing on whether the court used the precedent cited by the party, regardless of how the court
chooses to employ the prior case. In the second analysis, we test for factors that affect litigant
success by modeling whether the court uses the precedent in a manner that is congruent with a
litigant’s use of that precedent. Finally, we focus on the mechanism underlying litigant success
5

with respect to case outcomes. In this respect, we examine how the ability of litigants to
persuade a court to adopt their use of precedent is tied to winning and losing.
The Informational Role of Appellate Advocacy. Appellate briefs are expected to
provide courts with all relevant information needed to render a judgment. As noted by one
prominent appeals court jurist, “judges labor under the immense disadvantage of having very
little time to spend on each case . . . the judges are badly in need of the advocate’s help” (Posner,
2008:220). In transforming the case from the trial posture to one focused on appellate review,
counsel frame the issues and construct arguments designed to persuade the judges to rule in their
favor. As part of that process, advocates identify those legal authorities, including precedents
that are central to their arguments. By identifying and discussing precedents in their briefs,
advocates play an important informational role. The parameters of those efforts are defined by
the actions of the court below, with advocates representing appellants searching for reversible
legal errors made by the trial judge and advocates representing respondents arguing in support of
the status quo.
The search for legal authorities may begin with trial court decisions that use precedents to
develop the rationale for the disposition; however, the actions of the trial court (or administrative
judge) are often not framed for appellate review.5 Several examples may help illuminate the
distinction between the trial and appellate levels. For instance, a plaintiff may appeal a
summary judgment decision that is largely an account of the facts yielded from discovery. Or a
litigant who lost in a jury trial might focus his appeal on jury instructions or the trial court
judge’s rulings on admissibility of evidence. In some situations, there may not even be a trial
court decision, such as when a case is a direct appeal from an administrative agency decision.
As these illustrations suggest, the nature of the trial court disposition being appealed will vary,
6

but the expectations of the appellate advocate are constant. Advocates are expected to place the
alleged errors by the lower court in the appellate context. As part of that effort, they provide
information to the court on relevant precedents. Here, we evaluate this aspect of their
informational role through a model in which the dependent variable is coded simply as whether
or not the court cited a precedent used by the brief writer.
One would expect the degree to which a brief effectively provides courts with
information on the relevant precedents to vary with the abilities of the appellate advocate. In
recent extensions of party capability theory (Galanter, 1974), scholars have found attorneys with
substantial experience and expertise exercise more influence on the content of the court’s
opinion (Haire, Lindquist, and Hartley, 1999; Szmer, Johnson, and Saver, 2007). Here, we
expect that as the expertise and the experience level of the brief writer increase, the likelihood of
the court addressing that precedent will also increase. We also expect that other resources,
including those associated with the size of the legal team, will affect the likelihood of court
citation to the precedent. Past studies have suggested that as the number of attorneys on a party’s
litigation team increases, that party’s chances of success also increase (Szmer, Johnson, and
Sarver, 2007). Further, the presence of multiple firms may be influential (Wheeler et al., 1987).
Legal firms generally possess legal resources that go beyond the number of attorneys, such as
higher numbers of legal assistants, interns, extensive law libraries, and access to on-line
resources. Firms that specialize in appellate practice also may possess more procedural expertise
at the appellate level and, thus, may be more persuasive in identifying relevant precedents for the
circuit court.
In addition to being represented by more experienced, expert counsel, repeat-player
institutional litigants would be expected to identify precedents that have greater informational
7

value to the court than those used by individuals, particularly prisoners. One-shot litigants
(individuals), motivated by their immediate interest in the case outcome at hand, will be less
selective when identifying relevant precedents than institutional litigants who “play for the
rules.”
Judges may also be more likely to cite those precedents that are consistent with norms
surrounding horizontal and vertical stare decisis. By grounding an opinion in the law of the
circuit or the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, a judge will enhance the legitimacy of that
decision. Older cases may also lack the salience and influence of more recent precedents
(Hansford and Spriggs, 2006). Further, we would not expect a court to comment on each
precedent used by counsel. One would expect that judicial attention to a precedent is more likely
when the brief writer does not attempt to cite every possible case, whether highly relevant or not,
and chooses instead to focus the argument on a limited number of precedents.6 For this reason,
we expect that as more cases are cited within a brief, the likelihood of the court addressing any
single case from that brief should decrease. However, if both sides cite a particular case, this
may be an important signal to the court of a case’s importance, or at least an indication of the
need to recognize a precedent. Finally, one would expect that judicial attention to precedents
will vary with the salience of the legal policy area.
Data and Measures for Informational Models. Our analysis focuses on advocacy and
decisions from a single circuit: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. At the
inception of this project, this appeals court was the only circuit that maintained free electronic
access to parties’ briefs and opinions for civil (but not criminal) cases on its public Web site
(www.ca7.uscourts.gov). Although the single-circuit focus is a limitation on generalizability,
this approach offers the advantage of controlling for court-level dynamics.7
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The data-collection process occurred in several stages. First, we used a systematic
sampling design to identify a random sample of published civil cases from 2005 to 2007 from the
Seventh Circuit. Second, we downloaded the court opinions, the appellant briefs, and the
respondent briefs. This process yielded 86 cases and 172 briefs for the analysis, which
represented 10 percent of the universe of cases.8 Third, we identified each precedent used in the
appellants’ and respondents’ briefs considered to be a “strong citation” as used by the parties. A
citation was deemed to be “strong” if the author specifically named a precedent in its discussion
or quotes from the text of the opinion. Strong citations by brief writers included those that were
positive as well as those that were negative. String citations used by the parties in their briefs
were not included in the analyses.9 This resulted in 814 precedents used in our sample of cases.
Fourth, we analyzed the majority opinion, recording whether the court acknowledged the
precedent in any way or ignored the cited case altogether.10 Fifth, if the citation was
acknowledged in the opinion, we looked to see how the precedent was used by the court. We
coded these precedents in the court’s opinion as one of the following categories: ignored,
positive, negative, or cited in a string.
In the informational model, the dependent variable was coded as a 1 if the court
mentioned the litigant-identified precedent at all and as a 0 if the precedent was ignored by the
court in the opinion. While “mentions” include a wide range of court use (negative, positive,
cites in a string of cases), the implications of not mentioning a litigant-identified precedent were
clear: the court did not consider it to be relevant. As previously noted, adversaries at the
briefing stage follow a sequential process whereby the appellant’s brief establishes the initial
issue agenda, including the identification of a set of relevant precedents. For that reason, as well
as the need to control for the tendency of the appellate court to affirm the court below, we
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separate the observations by litigant status, modeling those used by appellants (n=402) separately
from respondents (n=412). Respondents, who must react to appellants’ arguments, will decide
which precedents to use from their opponent’s brief and may include other precedents that
support their position. Recognizing that a respondent’s use of precedent may be different when
the goal is to counter the appellant’s discussion of precedents (that are favorable to the
appellant’s position), we estimated another model of respondents’ unique precedents that
excludes those that were initially discussed by appellants (n=285).
As we discuss more fully below, the deference given by the appellate panel to the court
below, the sequential process of appellate advocacy, and the different goals of opposing litigants
should contribute to differential effects that vary by litigant status. For example, inexperienced
advocates representing appellants may be doubly disadvantaged because they are less skillful at
selecting a potential “winner” when deciding to appeal, while also lacking expertise in crafting
persuasive appellate briefs for the circuit court. In contrast, inexperienced advocates
representing respondents should not fare as poorly (compared to inexperienced appellants) as
they are in the easier position of supporting the status quo.
Our primary independent variables required the collection of multiple measures of
attorney, firm, and litigant characteristics. To evaluate experience levels, we follow previous
studies that use attorneys’ prior court appearances that have been used in past research
(Flemming and Krutz, 2002; Haire, Lindquist, and Hartley, 1999; Kritzer, 1998; McGuire, 1998,
1995; Wahlbeck, 1997). Although existing studies vary in the operationalization of this concept,
a reasonable expectation would be that the number of times an attorney has appeared before a
court should be related to their institutional knowledge and ability to identify precedents that
would be persuasive to that court. Therefore, we used prior appearances before the Seventh
10

Circuit as determined through Westlaw attorney-name searches. We found wide variation in
attorneys’ experience levels.11 Among appellants, approximately one-fifth of attorneys were
making their “debut” before the Seventh Circuit, whereas close to 10 percent had over twenty
previous appearances in cases decided by the circuit. Attorneys representing respondents also
demonstrated considerable variance: 22 percent were first timers, whereas 8 percent had been
involved in twenty or more previous cases decided by the Seventh Circuit.
Recognizing that the learning curve for appellate advocates may be steep (Haire,
Lindquist, and Hartley, 1999) and that previous appearances before the court may vary widely
within the legal team, we employed two indicators of experience. In one, we created a
dichotomous measure to distinguish litigants represented by counsel (including all on the legal
team who were listed on the brief) who were appearing for the first time before the Seventh
Circuit. In the other, we used the number of prior appearances for the first listed attorney on the
brief (if there were multiple attorneys) as followed from prior studies (Wahlbeck, 1997).12
Because of the skewed distribution of this measure (and the expectation that experience at high
levels may lead to diminished returns), we used the natural log of lead attorney experience. 13 The
two attorney experience variables are moderately correlated at r = -.41.
To determine whether the litigant was represented by a firm that specializes in appellate
practice, we looked up each firm on Martindale Hubbell to identify the areas of practice for that
firm. The dummy variable for appellate-specialist firms is coded as a “1” if the firm listed
appellate practice as an area of specialization and “0” if it did not. In examining a litigant’s
legal-team size, we also include measures for the total number of attorneys and law firms, if any,
that are listed as representing the litigant. To take into account the broader effect of party
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resources and repeat-player status, we created two dichotomous variables to flag briefs submitted
by individual persons and prisoners.14
We also constructed two dummy variables that indicated whether the precedent
referenced in the appellate brief was from the Seventh Circuit (1= 7th Circuit, 0 = all other
sources) or the U.S. Supreme Court (1= Supreme Court, 0 = all other sources). Thus, a zero for
both of these variables could indicate a precedent from a state court, a federal district court, or a
different federal circuit.15 In addition, work on the Supreme Court suggests that the persuasive
power of precedents will vary with its age, with its informational value decreasing over time
(Landes and Posner, 1976; Kosma, 1998). To account for this possibility, we follow Hansford
and Spriggs (2006) by including two variables, both the age of the precedent (in years) and the
age squared. As a citation to the same precedent by both parties may provide a stronger
indication of a precedent’s importance to the court, we also included a control indicating whether
both parties cited a precedent.16 Finally, because the court’s treatment of precedent might vary
across different case types, we included dummy variables for constitutional cases, prisoner cases,
and civil-rights cases (with economic/other issues as the excluded category).
Informational Model Results. Brief writers for appellants and respondents used, on
average, strong citations to four precedents in the development of their arguments.17 Table 1
displays the results that predict the likelihood of the court’s opinion citing these litigant, strongcited precedents, excluding precedents associated with issues not addressed by the court.18 For
both appellants and respondents, precedents raised in prisoner appeals were less likely to be
identified by the court, while for appellants, precedents raised in constitutional cases were more
likely to mentioned by the court.19 Appellants represented by “newcomer” litigation teams
(those with no experience) were less likely to see the court identify a precedent raised in their
12

brief. Interestingly, the measure of lead-attorney experience was associated with a reduced
likelihood of court attention to a precedent for appellants, contrary to expectations. This finding
is robust regardless of how this measure is specified (e.g., lead attorney or attorney team, logged
experience or total experience) and is not affected by removing the “newcomer” variable from
the model (which, as noted earlier, is only moderately correlated with the continuous measure of
attorney experience). One possibility is that more difficult appeals tend to attract highly
experienced attorneys who are especially aggressive in identifying precedents—and this highrisk strategy is more likely to yield information on previous precedents that the court does not
use in its decision-making process.
[Table 1 about here]
Our framework also suggested that counsel who had substantive legal expertise in
appellate advocacy, as indicated by a firm’s self-reported specialization in appellate practice,
would be more likely to use precedents that hold informational value for their judicial audience.
The results for Model 1 in Table 1 offer support for this hypothesized effect. For appellants,
using a firm with a specialization in appellate practice increases the likelihood of court citation to
their precedents from .16 to .26 (with all other variables held at their median values). In contrast,
access to other legal resources associated with the number of attorneys and firms did not affect
judicial citations to precedents identified by appellants’ counsel.20
The results for respondents (Models 2 and 3) portray a somewhat different story about the
role of legal resources. None of the variables that measure attorney experience and firm
specialization show a statistically significant relationship to citation by the court. While there is
a strong, positive effect for number of attorneys in Model 3, the results for the number of firms is
somewhat counterintuitive. When looking at precedents raised only by the respondents, the effect
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of the number of firms is significant but negatively related to citation by the court.21 Party
capability theory continues to be supported, however. Briefs submitted by individual-person
respondents were less likely to identify and discuss precedents that were later cited by the court
in its opinion when compared to those submitted by institutional respondents.
The characteristics of the precedent also affected the likelihood of the court referencing
that decision. For appellants, a Supreme Court case discussed in the brief was twice as likely to
be cited by the court than cases from any other court, all else equal. Appellants using a decision
from the Seventh Circuit increased the probability of citation from .16 for non-Seventh Circuit
cases to .24. Supreme Court precedents used by respondents were also more likely to be picked
up by the court; however, respondents’ use of Seventh Circuit cases did not affect the likelihood
of court citation to a statistically significant degree. Although precedent age did not affect the
likelihood of citation for appellants’ precedents, the results from one respondent model (Table 1,
Model 2) show a weak, though not curvilinear effect that favors newer cases.
As evidenced by the variable representing the effect associated with the total number of
precedents cited in a brief, the “scattershot” approach to identifying as many precedents as
possible does not affect the likelihood of court citation; however, precedents discussed by
opponents were more likely to be cited by the court. In the appellants’ model, if respondents
also discussed the precedent, it increased probability of court citation from .16 to .41, holding all
else equal. For respondents’ precedents, the probability increased from .20 to .57 when
appellants also discussed the case.
Taken together, these results underscore the distinct positions of appellants and
respondents in the appeals process, where the sequential process of filing briefs places more of
the burden of transforming a case from the trial posture on the appellant’s attorneys. Expertise
14

matters for appellant attorneys; those that have not previously appeared before the court are
statistically less likely to have their strong-cited precedents identified by the court, but firms
specializing in appellate practice fair better than non-specialists. As appellants are confronted
with the burden of persuading the appeals court to overturn the district court decision, it makes
sense that more experienced and expert attorneys representing appellants play a larger role in
informing the court of noteworthy precedents than those that have never appeared before the
court or do not specialize in appellate advocacy. However, we also find support for “team”
theories of litigation, where advocates on both sides play a role in providing information for the
court. When both sides identify the same precedent, the court appears to take notice and will
also use that precedent in the majority opinion. Yet all precedents are not created equal, as the
Seventh Circuit is more likely to address a precedent when it is a decision from the U.S.
Supreme Court or a case from its own circuits (at least for appellants).
Appellate Advocacy and Success. In this part of our analysis, we turn our attention to
evaluating factors that affect the likelihood of a court agreeing with the brief writer’s use of
precedent. While “winning” and “losing” with respect to the outcome of a case clearly
influences future cases, the breadth and actual language within the majority opinion establishes
the relevant policies, scope, and legal principles that may be binding for decades into the future.
Therefore, it is important to determine how the court uses the precedents raised by the party
briefs, even outside of the particular outcome of who wins or loses.
Data and Measures for Success Models. As before, our data are drawn from a random
selection of civil cases between 2005 and 2007. However, for this analysis, rather than
examining mere recognition of the parties’ strong-cited precedents, we focus on precedents
identified by only one party (but not both) and examine whether the majority opinion used the
15

precedent in the same fashion as the parties. To do this, we analyzed the majority opinions,
recording the court’s acknowledgment of the parties’ strong-cited precedents. If the court
acknowledged a party’s strong-cited precedent, we then coded the precedent as one of the
following categories based on the court’s use: positive, neutral, negative, or cited in a string.22
We excluded observations where both briefs cited the same precedent, as well as observations in
which the court ignored a brief writer’s precedent altogether, which leaves us with 69
observations for appellants and 62 observations for respondents.
For the “Success Models,” the dependent variables are coded in terms of whether or not
the court’s citation to a litigant-identified precedent was at odds with how it was used by the
brief writer (see Appendix B). We coded a “win” for a litigant in terms of whether the court’s
treatment of a precedent was congruent with the use of the precedent by the brief writer. For
example, if the brief writer uses the case positively (suggesting that a precedent is applicable and
controlling in the present case) and the majority opinion also cites that precedent in a clearly
positive way or relies on it in a string citation, then the dependent variable is coded as a 1
(“win”). Similarly, if the brief writer distinguished a case and the court also distinguished that
case, this was coded as a “win.” In contrast, a brief writer would consider it a “loss” if the court
used the precedent in a way that was clearly different than the use in the brief. In these
instances, such as where a party uses a case positively in a strong citation and the court then used
the precedent negatively (distinguished the case, overruled the case, or otherwise said it is not
controlling), then the dependent variable is coded as a “loss,” or 0.
The independent variables used for the success models are the same as those used in the
informational models, with one addition. We included a measure of ideological congruence to
control for any attitudinal predisposition of a panel to side with a particular party. To create this
16

variable, we first created a dichotomous measure of panel preferences (0 = conservative, 1 =
liberal) based on the ideological-median judge on the panel. Consistent with the coding of
multiuser databases on judicial decision making (Songer, 1997), we examined the party
matchups for each issue area and determined which party the panel would be most likely to
favor, given their ideological preferences. (For example, in an employment-discrimination case
that paired an individual against a business, we assume that a liberal panel is more likely to favor
the individual than the business.) The variable is coded as -1 if the party citing the precedent is
not ideologically aligned with the panel’s preferences, 0 (if congruence could not be clearly
ascertained), or 1 if the citing party was likely to be ideologically consistent with the panel’s
preferences.23
Our expectations for brief-writer success generally parallel those that emphasize the
informational role played by parties and their counsel. In addition, we expect that ideological
congruence between the party and the panel will be positively related to success for both
appellants and respondents.
[Table 2 about here]
Success Model Results. Among appellants, judicial receptivity to the brief’s use of
precedent was affected only by the experience of counsel who submitted the brief. In contrast to
the findings reported for the informational models estimated in Table 1, the number of previous
appearances (before the Seventh Circuit) by counsel for appellants increased the likelihood of the
court supporting their use of precedent in the majority opinion. For respondents, attorneyexperience levels did not increase the likelihood of judicial receptivity to the brief’s use of
precedent.
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While our predictions related to the other characteristics of counsel were not borne out by
the analysis, the likelihood of a brief writer and the court using a precedent in the same manner
was affected by characteristics of the precedent, but only for respondents. Binding precedents
cited by respondents were more likely to be used in the same way by the court, as the variables
for Supreme Court precedent and Seventh Circuit precedent indicate. However, this was not the
case for appellants. This is expected given the different roles of the parties and burdens placed
on appellants. Respondents often have positive cases on their side, while appellants may seek to
be more creative in attempting to sway the court into overturning the prior decision.
Our expectations for ideological congruence were partially supported. While ideological
congruence between an appellant and the court was not a significant influence on a brief writer’s
success, this variable was statistically significant for respondents. Holding all other variables at
their means (or modal values for dichotomous measures), the probability of success for a brief
writer increased from .47 to .74 as the court and party became ideologically congruent. This
finding is significant because it suggests that the attorneys possess influence over not only case
outcomes but also the substance of circuit opinions.
The Connections Between Case Disposition and Judicial Treatment of Precedents. The
findings from the first and second parts of our analysis offer mixed support for the view that
legal resources, including experience of counsel, contribute to litigant success in persuading its
judicial audience. Although traditional perspectives on appellate advocacy emphasize the
connection between arguments and success before the court, the disposition of the case may not
adequately capture whether a litigant prevailed. In this set of observations, 42 percent of
precedents favorably recognized by the court were associated with unfavorable case outcomes
for litigants. These figures suggest that it is not infrequent for parties to “win over” the court in
18

terms of the contours of the opinion while losing the case outcome. To explore this puzzle
further, we examine factors that affect the court’s use of precedents among case winners and case
losers.
As in Table 2, we again reconfigured the data so that we had one list of all unique
precedents; that is, precedents that were cited by both parties were excluded from this analysis.
From there, we separated the observation set by whether the party advancing the precedent
ultimately won (n=68) or lost (n=55) in terms of the case disposition. Observations in which the
case outcome did not indicate a clear win or loss and where the court ignored a precedent were
omitted from the analysis. We use the dependent variable from the success models (coded as 1 if
the brief and the court opinion used the precedent in the same way, 0 if in opposing ways). The
independent variables, and our expectations for those variables, are the same as those used in the
“success” models above, including controls for characteristics of the precedent, (age of
precedent, identity of cited court) and the policy area (constitutional, civil rights). Attorney
experience is included in this model, again measured as the logged number of previous
appearances for the lead attorney. “Newcomers” were flagged, in addition to indicators of the
total number of attorneys representing the loser, and whether the firm presented itself as
specializing in appellate litigation. We also add a dummy variable indicating whether the party
advancing the precedent was the appellant or the respondent. Finally, we include a variable that
captures the ideological predisposition of the panel to support the policy outcome. Our
expectation is that judges are more likely to agree with precedents advanced by a party when that
party is seeking a policy consistent with the ideological preferences of the panel.
[Table 3 about here]
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The results in Table 3 paint a mixed picture about the ability of traits of counsel to affect
opinion content. Among those who ultimately won their case, newcomer attorneys still fared
poorly in having the court adopt their framing of precedent. This suggests that even when firsttime attorneys win their cases, those victories may be due to factors outside of the attorneys’
skills in identifying and presenting persuasive precedents. In contrast, as Model 2 displays,
experienced attorneys representing losing parties were somewhat more likely to have their
characterization of the precedent adopted by the court. Thus, even when losing, more
experienced attorneys may be able to shape the court’s opinion by the use of precedent.
Interestingly, the size of the legal team and our appellate-specialization variables were
negatively related to agreement on a precedent when the party lost the case and produced no
statistically significant influence when the party won the case. One possible reason for this
finding may be that more difficult cases may draw larger and more specialized attorney teams.
Perhaps another explanation could be that larger and more specialized litigation teams are more
aggressive in framing cases that may not apply, at least in the court’s view.
The source of the precedent provides some, but limited, explanations when examining
winners and losers and the use of precedent. Case winners have more success when citing
precedent from the Supreme Court, though there was no effect for Seventh Circuit precedent.
This was not true for those that lost the case, as the precedent’s source exhibited little influence.
Ideological congruence is weakly significant and in the expected direction for case winners,
suggesting that not only did they win the case, but also were more successful in shaping the
opinion when they faced an ideologically friendly panel. However, we find no evidence that the
ideological preferences of the panel have any effect on the characterization of precedent for
“losers.” For case losers, citations in civil-rights cases were more likely to be contradicted by the
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court’s opinion, potentially pointing to more aggressive behavior of the attorneys in these types
of cases.
DISCUSSION
Our findings underscore the important informational role played by appellate advocates in their
ability to shape the contours of the court’s opinion through the identification of relevant
precedents. As noted by Seventh Circuit judge Richard Posner: “We call lawyers ‘officers of
the court.’ And in truth lawyers assist judges in a variety of ways. Judges rely on the lawyers in
a case to develop the facts on which the court will base its decision, to identify legal issues for
decision, and to do at least the basic legal research. . . . Yet at the same time that they rely
heavily on lawyers, judges do not trust lawyers completely, or even very much” (Posner,
1996:241).
As this quote indicates, judges rely on counsel to establish the issue agenda and identify
relevant case law; however, our results suggest that the informational value provided by
appellants’ counsel varied with the expertise of the legal team. Appellants represented by firms
with a specialization in appellate practice were more likely to find that precedents discussed in
their briefs were later cited. Appellants represented by litigation teams with no experience in this
forum fared poorly when attempting to call court attention to precedent. Whereas increasing
levels of experience were negatively associated with judicial attention to precedents, this same
variable increased the likelihood of the court’s opinion treating the precedent in a manner
consistent with the appellant’s use. We speculated that highly experienced attorneys may be
more aggressive in their identification of precedents, resulting in the low-information effect for
cases identified by these lawyers. This raises more potential questions and perhaps an interesting
topic for further research.
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Among those precedents that are ultimately acknowledged by the court in the opinion,
that acknowledgment is more likely to be a “win” when the precedent was advanced by
experienced counsel for appellants. This result may stem as a function of the sequential nature
of the process and the burdens placed on the appellants. As the default is to rule for the
respondents, attorneys with less experience and skill representing respondents may nevertheless
be successful. However, for appellants who face difficult legal hurdles in winning their cases,
more experience may lead to more influence through an ability to persuade the court concerning
relevant precedents.
Our analysis also revealed that certain factors influence whether the court treats a
precedent the same way as the party regardless of whether litigants win or lose the case. An
attorney with no experience before the circuit court is less likely to persuade a court when
framing precedents, even when the attorney’s client ends up winning the case. Meanwhile, more
experienced attorneys are able to succeed in getting the court to adopt their use of precedent
when their clients lose. Our results provide some support for the role of attorney experience and
build upon this strong line of prior research.
While we have no reason to believe that the Seventh Circuit represents a unique court
with respect to appellate advocacy, we fully recognize the limitations of an analysis that focuses
on a single circuit, as additional research is needed to evaluate whether these findings may be
generalizable to other circuits over time. Moreover, our reliance on an observation strategy that
consists only of decisions with published opinions is another potential limitation, as judges may
selectively use precedents as part of their effort to convince their “audience” that this decision is
legally accurate and well reasoned. Although some have suggested that non-published opinions
may include important public policy concerns (Songer, 1990), others, going back many decades,
22

have suggested that published decisions represent the major policy decisions of a court (e.g.,
Dolbeare, 1969). The court’s own publication guidelines suggest that only unique legal or
factual situations are worthy of publication. Therefore, while not perfect, examining published
opinions may serve as an acceptable practice for both theoretical and practical reasons.
Our findings regarding the informational role played by litigants support the notion that
judges rely on appellate briefs to identify relevant precedents for the court. Consistent with team
theories of litigation, precedents that were more widely used by appellants and respondents
garnered more attention from the court. Additional research will also be needed to explore the
informational roles played by other actors, including law clerks, staff attorneys, and the trial
court. While very few cases in the circuit courts involve amicus curiae participation, interest
group involvement may become a larger factor in the future as their participation in lower-court
cases continues to increase. Our findings regarding characteristics of precedents suggest that the
effectiveness of appellate advocacy may vary with the precedential framework employed.
Recent work at the Supreme Court level suggests that a party’s success in influencing court
decisions also stems from whether a party uses existing interpretations and framing of cases and
issues, or whether the party contextualizes the issue in a new or alternative framework
(Wedeking, 2010). Moreover, the particular ideology of the opinion writer or the panel majority
may influence which precedents judges select (Braman and Nelson, 2007), a conclusion that is at
least partially supported by our findings. Future research examining these issues could also be
instructive on the connections between litigant “inputs” and judicial “outputs” in high workload
courts, like the lower federal courts or state courts.
Despite the limitations discussed above, this project significantly adds to our
understanding of advocacy and the development of case law in federal appellate courts. The
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availability of more extensive resources, such as the Seventh Circuit briefs used in this project,
will undoubtedly assist scholars in using new methods to understand these complex situations.
This project represents another step in that direction as future research will continue to unravel
the multifaceted influences on judicial decisions. jsj
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Appendix A
Table of Independent Variables
Variable

Newcomer

Coding Scheme
1=no attorney on legal team has previous
appearances before the 7th Circuit
0=at least one attorney has previous
appearances before the 7th Circuit

Attorney Experience

Natural log of number of previous
appearances by the lead attorney

Appellate Specialist

1 = Firm lists appellate specialty on
Martindale Hubbard, 0 = otherwise

Number of Attorneys
Number of Firms

Number of attorneys listed on the brief
Number of firms listed on the brief

Individual Litigant

1 = individual litigant
0 = all others

Prisoner Appeal

1 = appeal by prisoner
0 = all others

Constitutional Case

Civil-Rights Case

Supreme Court

Seventh Circuit

Precedent Age
Precedent Age Squared

1 = Appeal raises constitutional claim
0 = all others
1= Appeal identified as a civil rights case
(excluding prisoner appeals)
0 = all others
1 = precedent is from the U.S. Supreme Court
0 = precedent stems from another source
1= the precedent is from the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals
0 = precedent stems from another source
Year the precedent was decided
Values from Precedent Age squared
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Opponent also Used
Precedent

Total Precedents Used

Ideological Congruence

1 = if “strong cited” in brief submitting by
opposing litigant
0 = not strong cited in brief submitting by
opposing litigant
Number of total precedents listed in Table of
Authorities of the party’s brief
-1 = Party raising precedent and median panel
preferences not ideologically aligned
0 = Ideological congruence could not be
determined
1 = Party raising precedent and median panel
preferences ideologically aligned
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Appendix B
Coding of Dependent Variable in “Success Models”
Attorney’s Use of Precedent

Court’s Use of Precedent

Dependent
Variable
Coding

Positive (applies/follows)
Positive (applies/follows)
Negative (distinguish/overrule)

Positive
String Cite
Negative

Win (1)

Positive (applies/follows)
Negative (distinguish/overrule)
Negative (distinguish/overrule)

Negative
Positive
String Cite

Loss (0)
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Table 1
Informational Role and Appellate Advocacy
Logit Model—Likelihood of Judicial Citation to Precedents Identified in Briefs

Newcomer
Lead Attorney Experience
Number of Firms
Number of Attorneys
Firm with Specialization in
Appellate Practice
Individual Litigant
Prisoner case
Supreme Court
Seventh Circuit
Precedent Age
Precedent Age Squared
Total Precedents Used
Opponent also Uses Precedent
Constitutional Case
Civil-Rights Case
Constant
Log Pseudo-Likelihood
Pseudo R-Square
N

Model 1:
Appellants
Coefficient
(RSE)
-.655*
(.375)
-.548*
(.115)
-.075
(.180)
.136
(.103)
.652**
(.253)
-.328
(.262)
-1.28***
(.427)
.825**
(.339)
.526*
(.297)
.007
(.016)
-.000
(.000)
-.007
(.008)
1.34***
(.267)
.536*
(.289)
.356
(.291)
-.487
(.492)
-217.75
.178
402

Model 2:
Respondents
Coefficient
(RSE)
.538
(.551)
.083
(.170)
-.171
(.183)
.158
(.097)
-.425
(.377)
-.672**
(.337)
-2.26***
(.437)
1.58***
(.372)
.209
(.312)
-.041*
(.021)
.000
(.000)
.001
(.007)
1.66***
(.332)
.191
(.483)
-.038
(.356)
-1.27*
(.650)
-224.14
.157
412

Model 3:
Precedents Cited
Only by Respondents
Coefficient (RSE)
-.492
(.804)
.049
(.166)
-.609*
(.314)
.225***
(.087)
-.410
(.358)
-.999*
(.585)
-1.36***
(.516)
1.73***
(.578)
.329
(.514)
-.033
(.035)
.000
(.000)
-.001
(.011)
-------.178
(.646)
-.321
(.463)
-.660
(.790)
-141.73
.088
285
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Notes: Coefficients reported with robust standard errors are clustered by case. +p<.10, *p <.05, **p <.01,
*** p<.001(one tailed). Model 3 includes precedents discussed in respondents’ briefs not previously
identified by appellants.
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Table 2
Logit Model of Appellate Advocacy and Success
Likelihood that Opinion Treatment of Precedent is Consistent with Brief Writer’s Use

Newcomer
Lead Attorney Experience
Number of Attorneys
Firm with Specialization in
Appellate Practice
Individual Litigant
Supreme Court
Seventh Circuit
Precedent Age
Precedent Age Squared
Total Precedents Used
Civil-Rights Case
Ideological Congruence
Constant
Log Pseudo-Likelihood
Pseudo R-Square
N

Model 1:
Appellants
-.266
(1.060)
.599*
(.353)
.026
(.301)
-.990
(1.357)
.554
(1.048)
.291
(1.470)
-.749
(1.105)
-.267
(.245)
.005
(.005)
-.006
(.024)
-2.900
(2.297)
-.516
(.581)
5.149
(4.213)
-19.381
.0275
69

Model 2:
Respondents
--.280
(.379)
-.295
(.168)
1.422+
(.980)
--1.88*
(.964)
1.640*
(.963)
.132
(.116)
-.003+
(.002)
.023
(.021)
1.376
(1.886)
1.184*
(.572)
-1.400
(1.441)
-23.028
.0277
62

Notes: Coefficients reported with robust standard errors clustered by case. +p < .10. *p <.05, **p <.01,
*** p<.001(one tailed). Model 1 includes precedents discussed in appellants’ briefs that were not also
discussed in respondents’ briefs; Model 2 includes precedents discussed in respondents’ briefs that had
not been previously identified by appellants. Collinearity prevented the inclusion of the variable
“constitutional cases,” “prisoner case” in both models, and the use of “newcomer” and “individual
litigant” in Model 2 and “prisoner” in Model 3.
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Table 3
Case Winners and Losers Logit Models - Likelihood of Congruence
Judicial treatment of precedent is consistent with party’s use
Independent
Variable
Respondent Party
Newcomer
Lead Attorney Experience
Individual Litigant
Total Number of attorneys
Firm with Appellate
Specialization
Supreme Court
Seventh Circuit
Precedent Age
Precedent Age Squared
Civil-Rights Case
Ideological Congruence
Constant
Log Pseudo-Likelihood
Pseudo-R2
N

Model 1:
Case Winners
-1.542
(1.028)
-1.743*
(.988)
.351
(.448)
---.162
(.259)
.283
(1.166)
2.290*
(1.304)
1.081
(.974)
-.055
(.099)
-.000
(.001)
-.091
(1.660)
1.313+
(.874)
4.746**
(1.950)
-18.551
.0247
68

Model 2:
Case Losers
-3.377+
(2.542)
--.845+
(.524)
-1.067
(2.165)
-1.038*
(.625)
-2.664*
(1.755)
.402
(.964)
1.134
(1.630)
-.121
(.150)
.002
(.002)
-3.265**
(1.098)
-.298
(.767)
9.885*
(5.556)
-14.877
.0460
55

Notes: Coefficients reported with robust standard errors clustered by case. +p < .10. *p <.05, **p <.01,
*** p<.001(one-tailed). Variables for “constitutional cases,” “prisoner appeals,” and “total number of
firms” were dropped because of collinearity; “individual litigant” was dropped from Model 1 and
“newcomer” was dropped from Model 2 due to collinearity,
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1

While each circuit has its own rules about the conditions under which oral argument is

necessary, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure note that oral argument should not be
granted if the appeal is frivolous, the dispositive issues have already been authoritatively
decided, or if the facts and arguments in the brief and record provide a sufficient basis for the
court to make a decision (F.R.A.P. 34(a)2.a-c).
2

It should be noted that judges do not exclusively rely on the attorneys’ briefs to convey the

legal arguments, as law clerks often prepare “bench memos” that summarize the arguments on
both sides and provide some evaluation of their relative strengths (Cohen, 2002). However, this
practice is not uniform across circuits or judges, so it is difficult to generalize about the role that
such memoranda play.
3

It is possible for issues to be raised and precedents discussed in oral arguments that are not

presented in the briefs. While this may occur at the Supreme Court level (Johnson, Wahlbeck,
and Spriggs, 2006) it is a rare occurrence at the circuit-court level. Unlike the Supreme Court,
oral arguments at the circuit level often deal as much with the factual issues in the case as the
legal justifications. However, to explore the possibility that new precedents were raised in oral
arguments, we listened to each oral argument from ten cases in our data (11 percent of our
sample). After listening to these oral arguments, we found no instances in which new precedents
not found in the briefs were raised, and minimal mentions of any precedents at all. The
overwhelming majority of the discussions in these oral arguments dealt with the facts of the case
or procedural issues, without reference to precedent. For this reason, we limit the focus of the
present study to precedents identified in the briefs and leave the examination of oral arguments at
the intermediate appellate level to future research.
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4

Responsible for ensuring uniformity in federal law, the Supreme Court recognizes the

importance of resolving conflicts between courts (see Rule 10). Nevertheless, as McNollgast
(1995) suggests, the high review costs associated with determining whether a lower court has
followed the Court’s preferences would contribute to a high level of tolerance for doctrinal
deviance. One study found the average length of time that an intercircuit conflict persists prior
to resolution before the Court was 8.2 years (Tiberi, 1993).
5

To address the concern that our findings are affected by the absence of a control for the district

court’s efforts in identifying relevant precedents, we sampled one-fourth of the cases (n = 22) in
our dataset to examine more closely the effect of the trial court disposition. Of the 22 cases in
our sample, only 68 percent (15) had reasoned district court decisions, including four that were
published in the federal supplement. Those district court decisions that did not have a reasoned
opinion involved challenges to attorney fee awards (n = 2), district court procedural rulings in a
jury trial (n=2), administrative decisions from BIA (n = 2), and a district court ruling that briefly
affirmed the decision of a bankruptcy court (n = 1). Of the 15 “reasoned” decisions by district
courts, the bulk of the discussion in each case was devoted to the court’s fact finding. Seven of
these 15 decisions discussed or included quotes from precedents with the other 8 decisions
relying on string citations to support the trial court’s arguments. If a reasoned decision had been
filed, we listed all precedents cited by the district court (including string citations, which made
up 75 percent of the total). Of the 119 precedents cited by district court judges, 78 percent were
not acknowledged by the USCA in the panel’s majority opinion; 17 percent (n = 21) were listed
by the USCA in string citations; the appeals court discussed or quoted language from precedents
identified by the trial court in 5 percent (n = 6). Appellate advocates used (strong cited) 25 of the
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27 district court-identified precedents that were ultimately acknowledged by the USCA. None of
the six precedents included in the trial court decision and later discussed by the USCA had
escaped the attention of an appellate advocate. Although further exploration of the role of the
district court in shaping the appellate context merits further study, we believe that these
observations suggest our assessment of judicial treatment of precedents identified by appellate
advocates will not be affected by the failure to include precedents identified by trial courts.
6

Likewise, arguing alternative strategies for one’s clients may entail using numerous precedents

that the reviewing court finds unnecessary. For example, attorneys will often argue that
dismissal is needed based on a jurisdictional issue and, in the alternative, argue for their clients
based on substantive matters, citing cases for both the jurisdictional and substantive issues. A
reviewing court may adopt the jurisdictional arguments and cite those precedents discussed on
this point in the brief, but ignore precedents used by counsel concerning the substantive issues.
For this reason, our analysis below only focuses on precedents raised in issues that are addressed
by the appellate panel.
7

We note that all circuits may have unique factors that limit the generalizability of examining

any single circuit. For example, the Seventh Circuit does not use “visiting judges,” and during
this period had a slightly higher reversal rate and published a higher percentage of its opinions
than other circuits (Fitzpatrick, 2008). However, in other ways it is very similar to the remaining
circuits. For instance, the civilian population of the Seventh Circuit is near the average for all
circuits, and the time to complete each case is near the nationwide average. Fifty-five percent of
appeals in the Seventh Circuit were criminal or prisoner appeals in 2007, as compared to the
national average of 52 percent. The average number of Democratic judges on the circuit during
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this period (27 percent) is slightly lower than the national average for all circuits (40 percent).
While one could argue that the Seventh is dominated by Illinois-area judges and attorneys,
evidence suggests that this may not be that different than other circuits, such as the Second (New
York), Fifth (Texas), Ninth (California), and the Eleventh (Florida) that also include a mixture of
one very large state and other less populous states (Emrey and Wasby, 2008).
8

Our data do not include the relatively rare, but important, cases heard by the circuit en banc.

Given our focus on the role of litigant briefs in the decision-making process, the inclusion of en
banc cases would have required a separate analysis that takes into account several earlier steps
where litigants provide written input, including briefs filed in conjunction with the original
panel.
9

A strong citation to precedent takes the following form: “A motorist who was shot by an off-

duty deputy sheriff was allowed to pursue his claim in Brown v. King, 328 Ill.App.3d 717, 767
N.E.2d 357 (1st Dist. 2002).” In contrast, a “string citation” does not elaborate on the specifics
of a holding and is often one of several citations listed at the end of a statement: “Post-arrest
beatings are within the scope of a security guard’s employment. Argento v. Village of Melrose
Park, 838 F.2d 1483, 1487-89 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Bryant v. Liuigni, 250 Ill.App.3d 303,
619 N.E.2d 550 (1993); Coleman v. Smith, 814 F.2d 1142, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1987).”
10

For the court’s use of party-identified precedents, we included instances when the court used

the precedents as a string citation. We believe that judicial acknowledgment of a case in a
footnote or string citation indicates that the case had some informational value to the decisionmaking process.
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11

The median number of appearances was 4, with the inter-quartile range of 1 to 10 for

appellants. For respondents, the median number of appearances was 8.5, with the inter-quartile
range of 3 to 15. The minimum and maximum values for appellants was 0 and 109, respectively,
while for respondents these were 0 and 193.
12

We recognize that there may be multiple means of measuring attorney experience, including

using the most experienced litigator’s number of appearances before a court (Flemming and
Krutz, 2002) and the average number of prior appearances for all attorneys involved. Research
on case outcomes frequently evaluates the effect of attorney capability by using a measure that
compares experience levels of opposing counsel. Difference-based measures may be less useful,
when focused on the informational role of counsel. Moreover, the sequential process of
submitting briefs results in respondents reacting to the precedents that are initially discussed by
appellants.
13

Following other scholars’ use of the experience measure (e.g., Johnson, Wahlbeck, and

Spriggs, 2006), for the log of attorney experience when the attorney had no experience, we added
a 1 to the natural log as the function is undefined at zero.
14

We also modeled party capability as a series of dummy variables: individual, federal

government, business, and other. However, in this operationalization, the only variable to
achieve significance was the individual dummy variable, so the substantive results mirror the
ones presented here.
15

We also explored whether state court cases deserved special treatment. Few citations (13

percent) stemmed from state courts with the vast majority of these states geographically located
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within the Seventh Circuit (i.e., Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin). Given the low relative
number, we decided not to create a separate variable for state cases for the sake of parsimony.
16

In alternative models (not shown), we included measures of case complexity in the

“informational” analysis: the number of issues raised in the briefs, the page length of the briefs,
and the presence of a consolidated case. Of these, only page length was significant and then only
for respondents, indicating that longer briefs are negatively associated with citation of a given
precedent. The estimates for the other variables in the model were not significantly affected.
17

While examining why some particular advocates prevail before Supreme Court, other scholars

have considered whether difference in resources between adversaries account for patterns of
litigant success (e.g., McGuire, 1995). This makes theoretical sense in examining the Supreme
Court as, with complete discretion in case selection, the roles of litigants are arguably less
distinct. Respondents may take a more active role in attempting to frame the issues, particularly
given the theory of “aggressive grants” (Perry, 1991). In the circuit courts, which have little
discretionary control over the dockets, litigants’ roles as appellants or respondents are much
more clearly defined by a sequential process. Often, respondents merely react to the appellant’s
arguments. Given the arguably larger burdens on the appellants and heavier presumption that the
respondent will be victorious at the circuit level, we chose to compare appellants to appellants
and respondents to respondents in separate models. This allows us to examine more nuanced
differences in advocacy, rather than highlighting the predominant influence of litigant role
orientations in the sequential process of submitting appellate briefs. We do note that in the final
part of our analysis, we pooled observations with litigant-identified precedents being the unit of
analysis.
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18

We also modeled the citation of precedent as a function of whether the court addressed the

issue associated with that precedent, using a Heckman selection model. However, because the
rho fails to reach statistical significance, we can safely conclude that selection model and the
prediction model are not positively correlated with each other, and selection bias is not
producing incorrect coefficients. For these reasons, we present the results of a logit analysis.
19

The variables Individual Party and Prisoner Appeal were only weakly correlated (r = .1).

20

We also tried modeling the relationship between party and attorney experience as a conditional

one by including a multiplicative term in the three models. The interaction was only statistically
significant in the model with the subset of respondent precedents, but given the very small
number of individuals in this set of observations (24 out of 296), the confidence intervals around
the predicted probabilities are too large to make any meaningful comparisons between party
types.
21

This result cannot be attributed to collinearity, as the number of attorneys and number of firms

is correlated only at r = .4 for these conditions.
22

In coding the treatment of the precedent, we generally follow the framework used by Hansford

and Spriggs (2006:44-45), who used Shepard’s Citations’ guidelines for coding positive and
negative treatment. However, we include string cites used by the court, as these are generally
supportive of the party’s use of these prior cases. For example, in Barricks v. Eli Lilly, 481 F.3d
556 (2007), the respondent, Eli Lilly, discussed at length the applicability of Radue v. KimberlyClark Co., 291 F.3d 612 (2000) in the respondent’s brief. However, the majority opinion simply
noted, “We have frequently discussed the dangers of relying on raw data without further analysis
or context in employment discrimination disputes,” and string-cited the Radue case, along with
42

others, as supporting this principle (Barricks, 481 F.3d at 559). While the opinion does not
expound on the precedent, string cites such as these show that the attorneys have been successful
in drawing attention to a precedent supporting their position. In examining cases in our sample,
we did not find an instance of a court string cite that was at odds with how the parties’ brief used
that cite, although we recognize that this is a possibility. Additionally, limiting our observations
to only strong citations by the court would preclude us from estimating a meaningful multivariate
model because of the small N.
23

We also included this control in other iterations of the informational model (not shown), but it

was not statistically significant and did not affect results for any of the other variables.
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